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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH
Appellant,

)
)

v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.

Case NO. 20040361-CA
)
Priority: 2
)

APPELLANT BRIEF MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The rule or statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to
decide the appeal is Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3. "An appeal may be taken
from a district or juvenile Court to the appellate court from all final orders or judgments".
On or about November 26th, 20025 Michael Richard Schubarth entered into a plea in
abeyance agreement. During an Order to Show Cause hearing on or about January 29,
2004, Judge Anderson found that Mr. Schubarth had violated his plea in abeyance
agreement, the guilty pleas were entered against Mr. Schubarth. Judge John R. Anderson
sentenced Mr. Schubarth on April 27, 2004.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Was the plea in abeyance agreement void because it was not entered in
accordance with Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5) and therefore did the trial court
err in not allowing a misplea.
3

STANDARD OF REVIEW. A question of statutory interpretation is reviewed for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. Norton, 67 P. 3d
1050 (Utah App. 2003).
II. Did the trial court err when the trial court found that Mr. Schubarth violated a
law; by issuing a bad check.
Point I
The State did not introduce sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that
Mr. Schubarth had violated a law; by writing a bad check.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The court's findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. Utah Dept. of Transp. v. G. Kay, Inc., 78 P.3d 612 (Utah
2003).
Point II
Mr. Schubarth argues that the court violated his due process rights by
denying him the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. "We review the trial court's decision to
revoke defendant's probation for correctness and accord it no particular deference." State
v. Tate. 989 P.2d 73 H 8 (Utah Ct App. 1999).
III. Did the trial err in interpreting the plea in abeyance agreement and therefore err
in revoking Mr. Schubarth's probation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The court reviews the trial court's decision to revoke
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defendant's probation for correctness and accords it no particular deference. State v.
Tate. 989 P.2d 73 ^ 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Interpretation of a contract presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Green River Canal Co. v. Thavn. 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003).
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT THE ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE
TRIAL COURT.
Issue I. The Appellant preserved this issue by written motion to the judge and at
the Order to Show Cause hearing: The Court: "Okay, help me with this one. I am
concerned about this one." R. at 705. Tr. p. 8, line 17-18. Mr. Thomas: "Yes." R. at
705. Tr. p. 8, line 19. The Court: "The statute says a plea in abeyance cannot exceed
three years. What are we going to do with that? R. at 705. Tr. p. 8, line 20 &21. Mr.
Thomas: I reviewed that statute as well, and that was brought up, of course, by the
defendant in his handwritten motion." R. at 705. Tr. p. 8, line 22-24. The defendant's
counsel further stated: Mr. Beaslin: Well, I've reviewed that motion also, you Honor.
That's 77-2(a> 2(5) on that three-year abeyance as indicated." R. at 705. Tr. p. 10, line
4-6. Further during Mr. Schubarth's testimony he stated: "The plea agreement was
dropped on me that day, and it was set for six years. No one said there was a three-year
statute, and I asked to counter .. ." R. at 705. Tr. p. 51, line 6-8. If the defendant did not
properly preserve this issue he argues plain error.
Issue II. The State of Utah tried to introduce hearsay evidence with regard to Mr.
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Schubarth having a bad check charge in Nevada. R. at 705. Tr. p. 22, line 7-18. Mr.
Schubarth's counsel objected, "I think maybe I'd object to that, your Honor"., R. at 705,
Tr. p. 23, line 9-10. Other hearsay evidence was introduced and Mr. Schubarth's counsel
objected, "Your Honor, I would object to that as being hearsay, your Honor." R. at 705,
Tr. p. 25, line 22-23. If the defendant did not properly preserve this issue he argues plain
error.
Issue III. Mr. Schubarth's attorney argued that the court should interpret the
agreement in the way that the first payment was paid on time. "So I think you can
interpret those from what Mr. Schubarth has said here today, and also the fact (inaudible)
he was in fact incarcerated he did pay what would be the $22,800, which was the first
payment, but the same was late." R. at 705. Tr. p. 55, line 9-12. If this issue was not
properly reserved Mr. Schubarth argues plain error.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
The appeal is taken from the guilty pleas entered by Judge Anderson after an order
to show cause hearing was held on January 29, 2004. The appeal is taken from the entry
of the guilty pleas and the sentence.
II. Course of Proceedings
On November 26, 2002, the State of Utah and Mr. Schubarth entered into a plea
agreement. The agreement stated, ""Defendant shall make payment towards restitution in
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the amount of $22,880.00 each six months. If payments in the amount of $22,880.00
have not been paid, the defendant will appear in this court for a hearing to determine if he
has substantially complied with the restitution payments." R. at 344.
The State of Utah believed that Mr. Schubarth had violated the plea in abeyance
agreement and filed an Order to Show Cause. R. at 396. The Order to Show Cause
hearing was held on January 29, 2004. R. at 557. At the Order to Show Cause hearing
the court found that Mr. Schubarth violated his plea in abeyance agreement. R. at 705.
Tr. p. 58, line 3-9. Mr. Schubarth was sentenced on April 27, 2004. R. at 706.
III. Statement of the Facts
On or about November 26, 2002, Mr. Schubarth entered into a plea in abeyance
agreement with the State of Utah. R. at 344-366. In accordance with the agreement, Mr.
Schubarth pled no contest to thirty one counts. R. at 344-346. In exchange for Mr.
Schubarth's plea, the pleas were to be held in abeyance for six years. R. at 359. In
accordance with the agreement Mr. Schubarth agreed to violate no laws of the United
States, the State of Utah or any municipality during the term of this agreement. R. at 359.
Further, Mr. Schubarth agreed to make payments toward restitution in the amount of
$22,880.00 each six months. R. at 360. The agreement further stated that "if the
payments in the amount of $22,880.00 have not been paid, the defendant will appear in
this court for a hearing to determine if he has substantially complied with the restitution
payments". R. at 360. Finally, the agreement stated that Mr. Schubarth "shall make full
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payment of restitution on or about November 26, 2008. Failure to pay the full amount of
restitution on or about November 26, 2008 is a violation of this agreement and shall result
in the entry on the record of all pleas." R. at 361.
Believing that Mr. Schubarth had violated the plea agreement the State of Utah
filed an Order to Show Cause. R. at 396-400. The Order to Show Cause hearing was
held on January 29, 2004. R. at 557-560 and R. at 705. At the hearing evidence was
introduced that Mr. Schubarth had made a restitution payment of $10,000.00 on May 28,
2003. R. at 705, Tr. p. 21, line 3-9. Mr. Schubarth made another restitution payment of
$12,880.00 on July 8, 2003. R. at 705, Tr. p. 21, line 16-17. See Exhibit 1. R. at 707.
The State of Utah also introduced hearsay evidence that Mr. Schubarth had written
a bad check in Nevada. "After this plea had entered, had you received notification from
any Nevada authority that the defendant had been charged with issuing a bad check?" R.
at 705, Tr. p. 22, line 7-9. "Yes, I was notified by the Nevada Attorney General's office
that he had been criminally charged, and that a warrant had been issued for his arrest for
issuing a bad check". R. at 22, Tr. p. 22, line 10-12. However, at the hearing Mr.
Schubarth clearly testified that he had not been convicted of any charge. R. at 705, Tr. p.
48, line 16-17. The State did not introduce any evidence that Mr. Schubarth was
convicted of any charge, including the bad check charge.
In addition, the State of Utah introduced numerous hearsay statements regarding
other possible criminal charges against the defendant. R. at 705. After the court heard
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the evidence, the court found that Mr. Schubarth had violated the plea in abeyance
agreement. R. at 705, Tr. p. 58, line 10-11. The court used the following rationale to
determine that the agreement was violated: "I'm not going to give a lot - any reliance on
the theft by false pretenses case. He hasn't been convicted yet. He has a presumption of
innocence on that." R. at 705. Tr. p. 57, line 23-25. "I'm not going to use that for a
basis. He did violate a law. He wrote a bad check and was apparently satisfied that in the
Sparks, Nevada Justice Court, and he did not make the payment of $22,8800 on the due
date." R. at 705, Tr. p. 58, line 3-6.
Summary of Argument
Issue I: Mr. Schubarth argues that the trial court erred in not declaring a misplea
and setting the matter for a trial, because the plea in abeyance agreement was entered in
violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5). Since the agreement was entered
in violation of Section 77-2a-2(5) there is obvious error. By declaring a misplea neither
party will be prejudiced.
Issue II:
Point I: The State did not introduce sufficient evidence for the court to find that
Mr. Schubarth had violated a law; by writing a bad check.
Point II: Mr. Schubarth argues that the court violated his due process right by
denying him the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses.
Issue HI: Mr. Schubarth argues that the trial court erred in interpreting the plea in
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abeyance agreement. The court used a time is of the essence standard in determining
whether Mr. Schubarth complied with the plea in abeyance agreement. The proper
standard of review should been whether Mr. Schubarth had substantially complied with
the agreement. Mr. Schubarth argues that he did substantially comply with the agreement
and therefore, he did not violate the agreement. Mr. Schubarth further argues the only
strict deadline of payment in the agreement was that the total restitution was to be paid on
or about November 26, 2008.
ARGUMENT I
ISSUE
WAS THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE AGREEMENT VOID BECAUSE
IT WAS NOT ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
SECTION 77-2a-2(5) AND THEREFORE DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT
ALLOWING A MISPLEA
RULE
c

"[T]he trial court may not refuse to comply with the terms of the accepted plea

agreement unless circumstances justify the declaration of a misplea [i.e., manifest
necessity]; otherwise, the double jeopardy clause will preclude a subsequent trial of the
defendant.'" State v. Moss, 921 P. 2d 102L f 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) citing (State v. Kav.
717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986). "The court stated, a "'misplea can properly be granted [1]
where obvious reversible error has been committed in connection with the terms of the
acceptance of the plea agreement and [2] no undue prejudice to the defendant is
apparent." Id. at f 6.
10

'The court in Kay explained when manifest necessity exists, i.e., when the trial
court has committed obvious reversible error." State v.Moss, at ^[7. "From a review of
the due process cases discussed herein and Kay's conclusion that there is no undue
prejudice so long as the defendant is restored to the same position as he or she would
have been in absent the plea, we conclude that to establish undue prejudice a defendant
must show that he or she has taken some affirmative action which would materially and
substantially affect the outcome of a subsequent trial. Id. atf 8.
Analysis
In this matter Mr. Schubarth believes that the court should have declared a misplea
and set the matter for trial. It is clear that even the trial court understood this alternative,
but chose not to declare a misplea. The trial court stated, "Yeah, and I guess the
alternative is - the alternative is to set it aside totally and find a trial date." R. at 705, Tr.
p. 11, line 1-2. Mr. Schubarth argues that the proper procedure would have been for the
court to follow his first reaction and set the plea aside and set a new trial date.
In Moss v. State, the defendant entered into a plea in abeyance agreement with the
State of Utah. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021 (Utah Ct. App). The defendant had been charged
with a first degree felony of rape of a child. Id. As part of a plea bargain the defendant
agreed to pled guilty to "attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony, on the
condition his plea be held in abeyance for twenty-four months at which time the charges
would be dismissed upon the trial court's determination that defendant had complied with
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the terms of the plea agreement". Id.
Subsequent to the defendant pleading guilty, the Utah Attorney General's Office
determined defendant's plea violated section 77-2a-3(7), which prohibited entry of a plea
in abeyance in any case involving allegations of a sexual abuse against a victim younger
than fourteen years of age. Id. When the problem was brought to the attention of the trial
court, the trial court set the plea aside. Id. In Moss, the court held that there would be no
double jeopardy problem if there is a misplea based on a showing of Manifest necessity
and no undue prejudice to the defendant. Id.
In Moss, the court noted that there is manifest necessity where obvious reversible
error has been committed in connection with the terms of the acceptance of the plea
agreement. Id. In Moss, the court held that when a plea is taken in contravention of the
express terms of section 77-2a-3(7), that this constituted obvious reversible error. Id.
Likewise, Mr. Schubarth argues that his plea should be declared a misplea based
on manifest necessity. Mr. Schubarth's plea in abeyance agreement placing him on
probation for 6 years was taken in contravention of the express terms of Utah Code
Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5), which states that a plea in abeyance for a felony cannot be
for a period longer than three years. Since Mr. Schubarth's plea in abeyance agreement
clearly violates Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5) it is obvious reversible error.
With regard to the second prong, undue prejudice, Mr. Schubarth will receive no
undue prejudice by setting the plea agreement aside, both parties would be restored to
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their original, pre-plea positions.
Wherefore, Mr. Schubarth requests that the court declare a misplea and set the
matter for trial, placing both parties in the position they were in before the plea.
ARGUMENT II
ISSUE
DID THE COURT ERR WHEN THE COURT FOUND THAT MR. SCHUBARTH
VIOLATED A LAW, BY ISSUING A BAD CHECK
POINT I
THE STATE DID NOT INTRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE COURT
TO FIND THAT MR. SCHUBARTH HAD VIOLATED A LAW BY WRITING A BAD
CHECK
RULE
The trial court's findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Utah
Dept. of Transp. v. G. Kav Inc.. 78 P.3d 612 (Utah 2003).
ANALYSIS
In the courts findings the court states, "He did violate a law. He wrote a bad check
and was apparently satisfied that in the Sparks, Nevada Justice Court..." R. at 705, Tr. p.
58, lines 3-4. This finding is clearly erroneous and goes against the evidence admitted at
the Order to Show Cause hearing. The only evidence introduced at the hearing that Mr.
Schubarth had violated a law by writing a bad check is as follows: the State introduced
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the following evidence by Michael Hines: "After this plea had entered, had you received
notification from any Nevada authority that the defendant had been charged with issuing a
bad check?" R. at 705, Tr. p. 22, line 7-9. "Yes, I was notified by the Nevada Attorney
General's Office that he had been criminally charged, and that a warrant had been issued
for his arrest for issuing a bad check." R. at 705, Tr. p. 22, line 10-12. "Okay. During
that were you also notified and/or did you have an opportunity to review documents that
defendant also received a warrant for failure to appear in that particular case?" R. at 705,
Tr. p. 22, line 13-16. "So this really addresses a charge having been filed and his failure
to appear, but it doesn't say what happened to it, right? That is correct." R. at 705, Tr. p.
23, line 5-8. Mr. Schubarth's attorney then stated, "I think maybe I'd object to that, your
Honor, as to the issue because it doesn't set forth what happened after that or if he was
picked up or what happened. It only says a charge was made." R. at 705, Tr. p. 23, line
9-12.
In addition, to the statements made above by Michael Hines, the state introduced
into evidence a certified court docket showing that a complaint had been filed against Mr.
Schubarth for drawing and passing a check without sufficient funds with intent to
Defraud. See Exhibit 2. R. at 707. The only thing contained on this exhibit was
information that Mr. Schubarth had been charged and had failed to appear for a hearing.
There is no indication that Mr. Schubarth was found guilty. Further, since this was not a
felony there was not even a probable cause statement for a bind-over. Finally, Mr.
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Schubarth testified that he pled not guilty. R. at 705, Tr. p. 39, line 7-8.
In this matter, the State of Utah and the court have equated being charged with a
crime as the same as violating a crime. The State of Utah introduced evidence that Mr.
Schubarth was charged with a crime but they produced no evidence that he violated a
crime. They never produced witnesses testifying that he wrote a check, that the check
was signed by him, that there was insufficient funds in an account, nothing. The State of
Utah believes it is enough to show that one is charged with a crime and that is sufficient.
Mr. Schubarth argues that this is insufficient evidence to prove that he violated a
crime under a preponderance of an evidence standard. Wherefore, Mr. Schubarth
believes the court clearly erred in finding that he had violated a law, by writing a bad
check.
POINT II
MR. SCHUBARTH ARGUES THAT THE COURT VIOLATED HIS DUE PROCESS
RIGHT BY DENYING HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFRONT ADVERSE
WITNESS
RULE
"In probation revocation proceedings where the defendant denies violating the
conditions of his or her parole, the persons who have given adverse information on which
the allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the
defendant unless the court for other good cause otherwise orders." State v. Tate, 989
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P.2d73 Tf 11 (Utah App. Ct. 1999). A finding of good cause required the trial court to
balance the defendant's interest in cross-examining a witness against the State's need to
use a particular hearsay statement. Id.
ANALYSIS
In Tate, and in the present case, the defendant's were brought before the court to
revoke their probation. In Tate and in the present case, the State of Utah, sought to make
its case solely through hearsay evidence, neither in Tate nor the present case did the State
call individuals with personal knowledge of the alleged incidents. Finally, in Tate and in
the present case, both trial courts failed to determine there is good cause for not
permitting the probationer to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant whose statement is
sought to be introduced as evidence, before admitting hearsay.
In Tate, the Court concluded that the trial court's admission of hearsay, in the
absence of a specific finding of good cause for denying confrontations, constitutes
reversible error. Id. at ^[17. The Court held that the trial court improperly determined that
Tate violated his probation and therefore vacated the trial court's order terminating his
probation. Id.
In this matter, Mr. Schubarth requests that the order terminating his probation be
vacated. He believes that the trial court acted improperly by not allowing him to crossexamine the individuals who alleged that he had written a bad check, including crossexamining individuals about the following information: that Mr. Schubarth had written a
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bad check, that he signed the check and that he had insufficient funds in his account etc.
ARGUMENT HI
ISSUE
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN INTERPRETING THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE
AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE ERROR IN REVOKING MR. SCHUBARTH'S
PROBATION
RULE
Interpretation of a contract presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Green River Canal Co. v. Thavn, 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003) "We construe an ambiguous
order under the rules that apply to other legal documents. Specifically, we look to the
language of the order, and we [may] resort to the pleadings and findings. Where
construction is called for, it is the duty of the court to interpret an ambiguity [in a manner
that makes] the judgement more reasonable, effective, and conclusive, and [that] brings
the judgement into harmony with the facts and the law." Culbertson v. Board of County
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 44 P.3d 642 f 15 (Utah 2002). "In addition, we
construe any ambiguities in the order against the prevailing parties who drafted i t . . . " Id.
Mr. Schubarth believes this issue was preserved on the record when his counsel
stated, "So I think you can interpret those form what Mr. Schubarth has said here today,
and also the fact (inaudible) he was incarcerated he did pay what would be the $22,880,
which was the first, but the same was late." R. at 705. Tr. p. 55, line 9-12. If this issue
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was not preserved Mr. Schubarth argues plain error. "Plain error requires a showing that
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i,e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
out come for the [appellant]." State v. Garcia. 18 P.3d 1123 ^ 6, (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
ANALYSIS
In this matter, Mr. Schubarth believes that the manner in which the State of Utah
argued and the way the trial Court interpreted the plea agreement to be in direct conflict
with the written terms of the agreement. Specifically, Mr. Schubarth believes the trial
court used a time is of the essence standard, instead of a substantial compliance standard
in determining whether Mr. Schubarth was in compliance with the six month payment due
date.
The terms of the plea in abeyance agreement are as follows:
First, Mr. Schubarth was to pay restitution in the amount of $274,550.00. R.at
360. The agreement further states, "[djefendant shall make full payment of restitution on
or before November 26, 2008. Failure to pay the full amount of restitution on or before
November 26, 2008 is a violation of this agreement and shall result in the entry on the
record of all pleas." R.at 360-361.
Mr. Schubarth believes that the date of November 26, 2008 was a strict deadline
and time was of the essence that all restitution payments had to be made on or before
November 26, 2008, or Mr. Schubarth would be in violation of the agreement. However,
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Mr. Schubarth believes that the six month payment dates were not strict, time is of the
essence due dates, this is based on the written agreement.
Second, the agreement stated, "[defendant shall make payments toward restitution
in the amount of $22,880.00 each six months. If payments in the amount of $22,880.00
have not been paid, the defendant will appear in this court for a hearing to determine if he
has substantially complied with the restitution payments." R. at 360.
It is important to note that this part of the agreement does not give specific dates
that the payments are due. The agreement goes further explaining that it is possible that
the $22,880.00 may not be paid within the six month period. In that event, the defendant
was to appear in court and if the court found that he had substantially made the payment
for that six month period he would not be in violation of the agreement.
The clear language of the agreement shows that Mr. Schubarth was to have the full
restitution payment of $274,550.00 paid by November 26, 2008. However, the individual
six month payments did not need to be paid in full or on exact dates as long as Mr.
Schubarth was making substantial payments toward the full restitution or substantial
payment toward $22,880.00 for that six month period.
Even the State's own testimony indicates that the six month periods and amounts
were not exact periods of time or amounts. Mr. Thomas the prosecutor asked his witness
Michael Hines, "Okay, and was it also ordered then that he was to make regular payments
specifically approximately (bold and underlining added) $22,000.00 each six months?
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That is correct". R.at 705. Tr. p. 19, line 12-15. Later, the witness was asked, "Okay.
So the first six-month period would roughly (bold and underlining added) be around the
May 26th date- That's correct". R.at 705, Tr. p. 20, line 10-12.
The record clearly shows that even the State of Utah understood the agreement.
That the six month payments did not have to be exactly complied with, that Mr. Schubarth
could pay approximately the amount owed and pay it roughly within the six month period.
However, in closing argument the State changed their story clearly arguing in direct
contradiction to the agreement. The State argued that there was a specific due date and
that Mr. Schubarth was late in the payment. In the Court's findings it is clear that he
followed the State's argument when the Court stated, "he did not make payment of
$22,880.00 on the due date." R. at 705, Tr. p. 58, line 5-6.
When interpreting a document, the language of the document should be interpreted
in a way that gives full meaning to all provisions of the document. Culbertson v. Board
of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 44 P. 3d 642 ^ 15, (Utah 2002). If the
document is interpreted as the State has argued and in accordance with the court's finding
then the language that the defendant was to appear before the court to determine if he has
substantially complied with the restitution payments, has no meaning. Further, the court
did not make appropriate findings that Mr. Schubarth did not comply as per the
agreement. Finally, since it was the State of Utah that drafted the agreement all
ambiguities should be construed against the State of Utah.
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Therefore, since the Court did not use the appropriate standard in determining
whether Mr. Schubarth had substantially complied with the agreement and since the Court
did not make appropriate findings the order terminating probation and entering Mr.
Schubarth's guilty pleas should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
The plea bargain is in direct violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5).
Therefore, there is obvious reversible error and the court should declare a misplea,
because either party will be prejudiced. The matter should be set for a trial.
The State of Utah did not provide sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that
Mr. Schubarth had violated a law; by writing a bad check. Further, the trial court erred by
not allowing Mr. Schubarth the opportunity to confront the witnesses that claimed that he
had written a bad check.
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the plea agreement. The trial court
applied a time is of the essence standard, instead of a substantial compliance standard as
stated in the agreement. Wherefore, Mr. Schubarth requests that the matter be remanded
and the correct standard applied to this case.
DATED this /ID th day of August 2004.

BryanuSidwell
Attorney for Appellant
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Appellant's brief was sent to the
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J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 E. 300 S. 6th FL
P.O. Box 140854
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Bryan Sidwell
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ATTACHMENT A
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ATTACHMENT A

G. Mark Thomas, #6664
Deputy Uintah County Attorney
152 East 100 North
Vernal, UT 84078
Telephone:(435) 781-5438
Fax:
(435) 781-5428

JTAH
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

~"~"~°EPLn>

IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN
ADVANCE OF GUILTY PLEA
AND AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH
DOB: 07/09/1955

Case No.

011800L66

Judge John R. Anderson
Defendant.
I, Michael Richard Schubarth, hereby acknowledge and certify
that I have been advised of and that I understand the following
facts and rights:
Notification of Charges

I am pleading jjjjiiiry to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

1.

Securities Fraud

Third Degree
Felony

2.

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP

3.

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP

4.

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP

5.

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
1 to 15 Years USP
Felony

Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

llj,

Crime & StatutoryProvision

Degree

Pun is lament
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
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Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP
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Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

25.

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

26.

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

27.

Employment of
Unlicensed Agent

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

28.

Employment of
Unlicensed Agent

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

29.

Employment of
Unlicensed Agent

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

30.

Employment of
Unlicensed Agent

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

31.

Pattern of Unlawful
Activity

Second Degree
Felony

Max. $10,000.00 Fine
1 to 15 Years USP

£L

I have received a copy of the Information against me.

I

have read it, or had it read to me, and I understand tfye nature and
elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty.
The elements of the crime (s) to which I am pleading
"gpjJLity a r e :
COUNT 1 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County,
State of Utah, on or about July 7, 2000, in violation of Utah Code
Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did willfully,
in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security to
James E. Burns, directly or indirectly; employed any device scheme
or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading; and/or engaged in any
act, practice, or course of business which operated or would

operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the amount was
$10,000.
COUNT 2
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about December 11, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to James E. Burns, directly or indirectly; employed
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 3
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about October 2000, in violation of
Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security to Dusty (Johnson) Grothusen, directly or indirectly;
employed any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;
and/or engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and
the amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 4
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about January 16, 2001, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Brian Jensen, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 5
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about September 12, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of

any security to Michael Nielson, directly or indirectly; employed
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 6
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about January 29, 2001, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Brian Skinner, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 7 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County,
State of Utah, on or about November 16, 2000, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security to Scott Sorenson, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made ciny untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was $10,000.
COUNT 8 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County,
State of Utah, on or about December 18, 2000, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security to Scott Sorenson, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was less than $10,000.

COUNT 9 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County,
State of Utah, on or about November 29, 2000, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security to Olin Draney, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was less than $10,000.
COUNT 10
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about September 21, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Julie Pierce, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was less than $10,000.
COUNT 11
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about November 10, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Julie Pierce, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was less than $10,000.
COUNT 12
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about September 6, 2 000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Arlene Thompson, directly or indirectly; employed
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact

necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 13
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about December 15, 2 000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Arlene Thompson, directly or indirectly; employed
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 14
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about July 7, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to James
E. Burns, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 15
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 11, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to James
E. Burns, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 16
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about October 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Dusty
(Johnson) Grothusen, in Utah which was not registered with the
Division, nor was the investment a federally covered security for
which a notice filing had been made with the Division, nor did the
security qualify for an exemption from registration.

COUNT 17
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about January 16, 2001, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Brian
Jensen, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 18
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 12, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Michael
Nielson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 19
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY# a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about January 29, 2001, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH# a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Brian
Skinner, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 20
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 16, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Scott
Sorenson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 21
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 18, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH# a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Scott
Sorenson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.

COUNT 22
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 29, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Olin
Draney, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 23
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 21, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Julie
Pierce, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 24
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 10, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Julie
Pierce# in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 25
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 6, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Arlene
Thompson# in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 26
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 15, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Arlene
Thompson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.

COUNT 27
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony,
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about September
2000, through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer,
did willfully employ or engage Amy J. Garcia, an agent who was not
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities.
COUNT 28
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT# a Third Degree Felony,
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about December
2000, through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer,
did willfully employ or engage James E. Burns, an agent who was not
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities.
COUNT 29
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT# a Third Degree Felony,
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about June 2000,
through in or about December 2 000, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, did
willfully employ or engage Lloyd V, Wales, an agent who was not
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities.
COUNT 30
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony,
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about June 2000,
through in or about December 2 000, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, did
willfully employ or engage Nathan S. Hardman, an agent who was not
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities.
COUNT 31 PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a Second Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, from on or about June 16, 2000
through January 29, 2001 in violation of §76-10-1603, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD
SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, received proceeds derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity as more
fully defined in Counts 1 through 3 0 above, in which they
participated as a principal, or they used or invested, directly or
indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income,
or the proceeds derived from the investment or use of those
proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or establishment
or operation of, any enterprise; through a pattern of unlawful
activity acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise; or were employed by, or
associated with any enterprise and conducted or participated,
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
The unlawful
activity included three or more violations of securities fraud.
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I understand that by pleading 'g^ririry I will be a*3mittfflg

r£hat 7. ^^mfiittcd the crimes

listed

above.

I stipulate

and

agree

that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of
other persons for which I am criminally liable.

These facts

provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas and prove
the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty:
Count(s) 1 - 1 3

SECURITIES FRAUD

Count(s) 1 3 - 2 6

SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY

Count(s) 2 7 - 3 0

EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT

Count 31

PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY

£

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that

I have the following rights under the constitutions of Utah and the
United States.

I also understand that if I plead' g^tri±y

I will

give up all the following rights:

a

Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented

by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay
for the appointed lawyer's service to me.
I (have not) (Ij^Ve) waived my right to counsel. I certify
that I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and
elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty.
I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty plea(s).

!i

(P
^
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
Blake Nakamura.
My attorney and I have fully discussed this
statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea(s).
^V

Jury Trial.

I know that I have a right to a speedy and

public trial by an impartial

(unbiased) jury and that I will be

gijving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know
that if I were to have a trial I would have the right to see and
observe the witnesses in open court who testified against me and b)
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would
have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who
testified against me in open court.
Vkft

Right to compel witnesses.

I know that if I were to have

a trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to and I would be able
to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those
witnesses.

If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to

appear, the State would pay those costs.
t\p*

Right

incrimination.

to

testify

and

privilege

against

self-

I know that if I were to have a trial, I would have

the right to testify on my own behalf.

I also know that if I chose

not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give
evidence against myself.

I also know that if I chose not to testify,

the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify
against me and if it were a non-jury trial, the judge would not hold my
refusal against me.

*

Presumption of innocence and burden of proof.

I know

that if I do not plead guilty, I am presumed innocent until the
State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime (s) . If I choose
to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty,"
and my case will be set for a trial.

At a trial, the State would

have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a
reasonable doubt.

If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must

be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
XJQ

I understand that if ,1^plead

guilty, I give up the

presumption of innocence and wil]/\be admittingfchatI coraftjrfcfeed the
crime(s) stated above.

v
/>

Appeal.

I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I

were convicted by a jury or judge, I would have the right to appeal
my conviction and sentence.

If I could not afford the costs of an

appeal, the State would pay those costs for me.

I undeirstand that

I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty.
^

/Off (jfrSftJ

I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am
waiving and giving up all the statutory and constitutional rights
as explained above.

0

Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea
sentence that
may be penalties.
imposed for each
crime
which I and
am pleading
Potential
I know
thetominimum
maximum
guilty.

I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a

mandatory penalty,

I will be subjecting myself

to serving a

mandatory penalty for that crime.

I know my sentence may include

a jail/prison term, fine, or both.
v^

I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent

(85%) surcharge will be imposed.

I also know that I may be ordered

to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part
of a plea agreement.
<&

Consecutive/concurrent

prison terms.

I know that if

there is more than one crime involved, the sentences may be imposed
one after another (consecutively) , or they may run at the same time
(concurrently) .

I know that I may be charged an additional fine

for each crime that I plead to.

I also know that if I am on

probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty
plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on
me.

If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when

I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to
impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on
the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.

£

Trial

judge

not

bound.

I know

that

any

charge

or

sentencing concession or recommendation of probation or suspended
sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made
or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are
not binding on the judge.

I also know that any opinions they

express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not
binding on the judge.

Defendants Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice.

No

force, threats, of unlawful influence of any kind have been made to
get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this
statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an
attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt each statement in
it as my own.

I know that I am free to change or delete anything

contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am
I 2/M

4 I

years of age.

I have attended school through the

grade. I can read and understand the English language. If

I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to
me.

I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or

intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead
guilty.

I am not presently under the influence of any drug,

medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be
mentally

capable

of

understanding

consequences of my plea.

these proceedings

and

the

I am free of any mental disease, defect,

or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am
doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my
plea.

i
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my %»*i±fey plea(s), I
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days

after I have been sentenced and final judgment has been entered.
I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause.
I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any
reason.

a

Plea bargain.

My plea is a result of a plea bargain

between myself and the prosecuting attorney.

The promises, duties

and provisions of this plea agreement, if any, are fully contained
in this agreement and are as follows:
1.

I hereby enter my plea of guilty to the charges of:
Count(s) 1 - 1 3

SECURITIES FRAUD

Count(s) 1 3 - 2 6

SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY

Count(s) 2 7 - 3 0

EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT

Count 31

PATTERN OE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY

Jp Corner
2.

Upon acceptance of the ^trirtty plea, the State does

hereby recommend that the Court place the plea in abeyance and not
cause it to be entered upon the records for a period of SIX (6)
YEARS on the following terms:
^

a.

Defendant hereby agrees to make

himself

available to report to the Court whenever requested to do so and
further agrees to keep both his attorney and the Uintah County
Attorney apprised as to his current mailing address at all times.
@

b.

Defendant hereby agrees to violate no laws of

the United States, the State of Utah, or any municipality during
the term of this agreement.

In the event that Defendant

is

arrested, cited, or otherwise charged with any violation, Defendant

&

shall notify the County Attorney's office within 72 hours of said
violation.
c.

Defendant shall pay restitution to named victims

as listed in the information and victims listed herein which are
not listed in the information as follows:
James Burns
Dusty Grothusen
Brian Jensen
Michael Nielson
Brian Skinner
Scott Sorenson
Olin Draney
Julie Peirce
Arlene Thompson
Darlene Burns
Mark Caldwell
Lisa Glick
Floyd Morton
Linette Rollins
Dale Kidd
Carol Dixon
TOTAL
d.

$50,000.00
$11,000.00
$14,000.00
$15,000.00
$35,000.00
$12,500.00
$9,100.00
$7,500.00
$59,000.00
$20,000.00
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$10,000.00
$1,450.00
$274,550.00

Defendant shall make payments toward restitution

in the amount of $22,880.00 each six months.

If payments in the

amount of $22,880.00 have not been paid, the defendant will appear
in this court for a hearing to determine if he has substantially
complied with the restitution payments./ The sole i^s<ie for review
is whether there has been substantial compli^6e
agreement.

with the payment

The defendant expressly waives any/right he may have

for the court to hear arguments concerning his ability to pay. \
e.

Defendant shall make full payment of restitution

on or before November 26, 2 008.

Failure to pay the full amount of

restitution on or before November 26, 2008 is a violation of this
agreement and shall result in the entry on the record of all pleas.
H!>

Full payment of restitution is an absolute term of this

agreement.

Failure by defendant to pay full restitution for any

reason shall result in a violation of this agreement and result in
the entry of all pleas on the record.
\o

That this matter come before the court for review on the

second law and motion day in Npv^mber 2003, at 10:00 a.m. or at
such other time as the Court may hereinafter set.

If at that time

the Court finds that all the restitution has been paid and there
have been no other violations of the plea agreement, the defendant
will be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charges of
(1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES#
(27-30)

EMPLOYMENT

OF

UNLICENSED

AGENT,

and

(31)

PATTERN

OP

UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, and the court may then entertain a motion from
the Defendant to dismiss these charges.

The State will concur in

such motion if there have been no violations of the agreement, the
restitution.has been paid and there are no violations pending.
Count 26, SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES will then enter
against the defendant.
said charge.

The defendant will then be sentenced on

The State agrees not to argue for jail or prison

time, or a fine in light of the substantial restitution in this
matter.

The State will argue for a term of probation not to exceed

1 year.

The State will not object to a Motion by the defendant to

reduce the charge to the next lower category only in the following
circumstances:

a.

Defendant is placed on probation;

b.

Defendant

is

subsequently

discharged

from

probation

without violating any terms of his probation;
c.

Defendant

violates

no

laws

during

the

term

of

his

probation an up until his motion to reduce the category
of the offense; and
d.

Defendant

successfully

completes

the

term

of

his

probation.

j&

If the defendant does not have all the restitution paid

on or beforejEtoyeffiber* 26, 2003, but does have the restitution paid
on or before Meveinber 26, 2008, then this matter will

come before

the court for review on the second law and motion day in November
2008,

at

10:00

a.m.

hereinafter set.

or at

such

other

time

as

the Court

may

If at that time the Court finds that all the

restitution has been paid and there have been no other violations
of the plea agreement, the defendant will be allowed to withdraw
his plea of guilty to the charges of (1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (1426)

SALE

OF

UNREGISTERED

SECURITIES,

(27-30)

EMPLOYMENT

OP

UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, and the
court may then entertain a motion from the Defendant to dismiss
these charges.

The State will concur in such motion if there have

been no violations of the agreement, the restitution has been paid
and there are no violations pending.
Counts 23-2 6, SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, will then
enter against the defendant.
on said charges.

The defendant will then be sentenced

The State agrees not to argue for jail or prison

&

time, or a fine in light of the substantial restitution in this
matter.
ma.
ui

The State will argue for probation.
If, at any time during the term hereof, it comes to

the attention of the Uintah County Attorney that Defendant has
failed to comply with any of the terms of this agreement, the
County

Attorney

may

then

go

to

the

Court

and

request,

by

appropriate motion and affidavit, an Order to Show Cause requiring
Defendant

to appear

and

show

cause why

judgement

for

SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY,
EMPLOYMENT

OF UNLICENSED AGENT,

and

(31) PATTERN

OF

(1-13)
(27-30)

UNLAWFUL

ACTIVITY should not be imposed and Defendant sentenced accordingly.
Service of said Order to Show Cause may be had upon defense counsel
and Defendant does hereby waive personal service upon him of any
such order.

If, after a hearing, the Court makes a finding that

there is evidence that Defendant has failed to strictly comply with
all terms of this agreement it shall immediately order imposition
of the

(1-13) SECURITIES

FRAUD,

(14-26)

SALE OF

UNREGISTERED

SECURITY, (27-30) EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN
OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY judgement and Defendant shall be sentenced
accordingly.
Dated this 26th day of November, 2002

MICHAEL RICHA:
DEFENDANT

<^V*-£ j,
Certificate of Defense Attorney
I

certify

that

I am

the attorney

for MICHAEL

RICHARD

SCHUBARTH, the defendant above, and that I know he has read the
statement or that I have read it to him.

I have discussed it with

him and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent.

To the best of

my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements

of

the

crime (s)

and

the

factual

synopsis

of

the

defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along
with the other representations

and declarations made by

defendant in the foregoing affidavit, ^r_e accurate and true.

BLAgE^AKAMURA
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

21

the

6?

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH,

defendant.

I have

reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s)
is true and correct.
to

encourage

a

plea

No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
has

been

offered

defendant.

The

plea

negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached
Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court.
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support
the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s)
are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the
public interest.

G. MARK THOMAS
PROSECUTION ATTORNEY

22

Order
The Court, having heard the representations made to it by
counsel, having determined that Defendant is fully aware of his
constitutional

rights

and

of

the purpose

of

this

proceeding,

accepts Defendant's pleas of guilty and finds that it is knowingly
made and that he is under no undue stress or influence.

The Court

further approves the terms of the agreement set forth hereinabove
and orders that Defendant's plea of guilty be placed in abeyance
and that judgment not be entered against Defendant at this time but
rather that imposition of judgment be stayed pursuant to the terms
of the above set forth agreement until the
Motion Calendar in
Court may order.
herein

against

Law and

or until such other time as the
Until such time as judgment is formally entered

Defendant,

or

charges

are

dismissed

against

Defendant, Defendant is ordered to comply with all terms of the
above set forth agreement and failure to do so shall be dealt with
accordingly to the terms thereof.
DATED this 2 6th day of November, 2(

TDERSON
District Court Judge
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ATTACHMENT! J

NO. SJC 03-982
DEPARTMENT NO. 2

In the Justice Court of Sparks Township, County of Washoe
STATE OF NEVADA
The State of Nevada

COMPLAINT OF
MEGAN RACHOW
AGENCY NO. SPD 03-3155
DA NO. 311100

PLAINTIFF
vs.
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH
DEFENDANT

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
CHARGING: CT. I. DRAWING AND PASSING A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT
FUNDS WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD, all misdemeanors.

DATE
2003
May- 09

June 02
June 03

PROCEEDINGS

Complaint filed on the above charge having occurred on or about
the 31st day of December, 2002.
Summons issued to Sparks Police Department for Defendant to appear
at Sparks Justice Court on the 2nd day of June, 2003, at 8:15AM.
Defendant failed to appear.
A BENCH warrant has been issued in the amount of $500.00 CASH ONLY
for FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR ARRAIGNMENT.
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Janine Baker, Clerk, Sparks Jusxe's Court
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